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ABSTRACT

A recent FTC complaint has generated questions about the legality and effects of
blanket copyright warnings issued by large sports and media companies. Copyright
warnings from the NFL, MLB, and major motion picture studios often assert that no
use whatsoever of their materials can be made without express permission, contrary
to several provisions of U.S. copyright law. This comment proposes limiting the
content and language of such warnings so consumers have a clearer view of what
copyright law allows, and are not intimidated into foregoing their rights to use
protected works. Exceptions like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy prevent
copyright holders from completely prohibiting all uses of their copyrighted materials.
Companies making these claims may be guilty of copyright misuse, a doctrine that
offers courts the opportunity to scale back aggressive copyright warnings.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF COPYRIGHT WARNINGS

We made it son!" said Homer Simpson, as he sailed Mr. Burns' yacht
across the United States boundary line. "International waters-the land
that law forgot!"
Homer peered through his binoculars at the nearby ships. He saw
cowboys having a Wild West gunfight next to a boat full of bikini-clad party
girls. A bullfight took place atop a cabin cruiser, while a sea captain
married a man and a cow.
"Wow, you can do anything out here!" exclaimed Bart.
"That's right," said Homer. "See that ship over there? They're
rebroadcasting Major League Baseball with implied oral consent, not
express written consent-or so the legend goes." 1
Even before The Simpsons poked fun at big media companies' ominous copyright
warnings, consumers had already shrugged their shoulders at them. 2 Many people
can probably recite the Major League Baseball ("MLB") warnings from memory, as
well as those of the National Football League ("NFL") and the ubiquitous FBI
3
warnings on DVDs.
If companies employing these notices seek to stem copyright violations, then the
notices have proven ineffective, considering the record losses these companies claim
to have suffered from piracy lately.4 What they truly seek to accomplish is no secret:
to convince the public, through pervasive and ominous warnings, that the smallest
degree of unauthorized use of their material violates copyright laws, and that any
such violation will be met with swift punishment.
Recently, the Computer & Communications Industry Association ("CCIA")
challenged these warnings as unfair, confusing, and misrepresentative of copyright

J.D. Candidate 2009, B.A. Loyola University Chicago.
Available at www.jmripl.com.
1 The Simpsons: The Mansion Family (FOX television broadcast Jan. 23, 2000), available at
http://watchthesimpsonsonline.com/movie/33-The-Simpsons- 112_TheMansionFamily.html.
2 John Eggerton, NBC U. Copyright Warning Complaintis Frivolous, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6464843.html
("IT]he current FBI
warnings are generally either ignored, overlooked, or made fun of, in part because of the hardline
they effect-which consumers do not recognize as applying to them.").
3 Maura Corbett, Separatingfact from fiction on digital copyrights, CNET, Aug. 27, 2007,
http ://www.news.com/Separating-fact-from-fiction-on-digital-copyrights/2010 1030_3-6204450.html.
4 Sarah McBride & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Studios See Big Rise in Estimates of Losses to Movie
Piracy,WALL ST. J., May 3, 2006, at B1 (noting movie studios lose $6.1 billion globally per year,
about 75% more than the prior estimate).
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law. 5 The CCIA asked the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to reconfigure such
notices to better reflect consumers' ability to make legal, unauthorized use of
copyrighted material. 6 For example, there is considerable leeway for individuals to
use such material in educational settings, and some parts of it may not actually be
subject to copyright protection in the first place (e.g. plain facts, like unedited MLB
player statistics).
The CCIA 7 filed its complaint against six sports, entertainment, and publishing
companies alleging deceptive trade practices and unfair trade practices in violation of
section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).8 The complaint states that copyright
warnings or anti-piracy warnings used by those companies "materially misrepresent
U.S. copyright law" to the detriment of consumers. 9 According to the CCIA, the
misrepresentation arises because (1)U.S. copyright law actively encourages "the
unauthorized use of copyrighted works," and (2) "facts or ideas" are not copyrighted
properties of those companies as falsely claimed. 10 The named companies have
promulgated copyright warnings giving an impression no one may use their
copyrighted materials for any purpose without their permission, and that this is the
case for copyrighted material in general.11 In particular, the complaint alleges that
telecasts of the NFL 12 and MLB 13 falsely assert that no accounts or descriptions of

5Request for Investigation and Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, In re
Misrepresentation of Consumer Fair Use and Related Rights, No.
- (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 1,
2007), as attachedto Letter from Matthew Schruers, Senior Counsel for Litig. & Legislative Affairs,
Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Assoc., to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y of the Comm'n, Office of the Sec'y,
Fed. Trade Comm'n (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/070801CCIA.pdf [hereinafter
CCIA Complaint] (complaining against six copyright-holding corporations: the National Football
League, Major League Baseball, NBC Universal, DreamWorks Animation SKG, Harcourt Inc., and
Penguin Group (USA)). As a matter of policy, the FTC does not confirm or deny the existence of a
non-public investigation, and therefore has not assigned a docket number or other identification to
the CCIA's complaint. Letter from Matthew Schruers, Senior Counsel for Litigation & Legislative
Affairs, Computer & Communications Industry Association to Cory Tadlock (Oct. 30, 2007, 12:53:00
CST) (on file with The John Marshall REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW).
(3CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 67.
7 Computer & Communications Industry Association, http://www.ecianet.org/about.html (last
visited April 17, 2008). The CCIA represents at least twenty-five major technology and computer
companies, including Google, Microsoft, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Yahoo!. Id.; see also Letter
from Prudence S. Adler, Associate Executive Director, Library Copyright Alliance, available at
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/FTC- complaint 01aug07.pdf (describing a letter to the FTC
Chairman to "support strongly the request for investigation and complaint for injunctive relief filed
by the Computer & Communications Industry Association."). The Library Copyright Alliance
collectively represents over 80,000 information professionals and thousands of libraries of all kinds.
Library Copyright Alliance, Welcome, http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/ (last visited May 22,,
2008).
s CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 5-10, 52-61; see also Sarah McBride & Adam
Thompson, Google, Others Contest Copyright Warnings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at B3.
9 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 18.
10Id.

11
CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 17.
12
Eric Bangeman, FTC Complaint Flags NFL, MLB, Studios for Overstating Copyright
Claims, ARSTECHNICA, Aug. 1, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070801-ftc-complaintflags-nfl-mlb-studios-for-overstating-copyright-claims.html.
The NFL warns throughout its
broadcast games, "This telecast is copyrighted by the NFL for the private use of our audience. Any
other use of this telecast or of any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of the game without the NFL's
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the games can be disseminated without written consent. 14 The complaint also cites
misleading warnings 15 by motion picture companies on DVDs 16 and home video
failing to acknowledge legitimate but unauthorized uses of their work for educational
or critical purposes.17
The CCIA argues that print media contains similar
misrepresentations, warning "no part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means" without written permission.18
As a remedy to the misrepresentation problem, the CCIA seeks revised copyright
notices that would call attention to companies' lawful protection of their intellectual
property, while simultaneously highlighting the interests and rights of consumers to
make reasonable use of protected material. 19 For instance, the CCIA approves of
copyright notices that affirmatively acknowledge consumers' rights to make
unauthorized use of the works. 20 This remedy, though, presents legal obstacles of its
own.
This comment examines the capacity for government and consumers to reduce
the hyperbole present in copyright warnings in order to achieve a more equitable
consent is prohibited." Id.; see also NFL v. Primetime 24, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (noting the NFL verbal copyright warning given in each and every game broadcast).
13 McBride & Thompson, supra note 8, at B3. Major League Baseball presents the following
warning during its broadcast games: "This copyrighted telecast is presented by authority of the
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball. It may not be reproduced or retransmitted in any form, and
the accounts and descriptions of this game may not be disseminated, without express written
consent." -d. The league has previously attempted (and failed) to enforce a copyright on its players'
names and statistics as used by fantasy baseball games. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2006). Recently, MLB has
moved to watermark its broadcasts so that it can monitor how they are used and distributed by
television, cable and satellite stations around the world. Michael Hiestand, Ripken Will Get to Take
Swings at Actual PlayoffPitches as TBSAnalyst, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2007, at 2C.
14 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 22.
15Id.para. 28. Warnings on DVDs produced by Universal and Morgan Creek, among other
companies, assert, "Any unauthorized exhibition, distribution, or copying of this film or any part
thereof (including soundtrack) is an infringement of the relevant copyright and will subject the
infringer to severe civil and criminal penalties." Id.
16Id. The DVDs and their packaging include such statements as "WARNING: For private use
only. Federal law provides severe civil and criminal penalties for the unauthorized reproduction,
distribution or exhibition of copyrighted motion pictures and video formats." Id. para. 30. Some
DVDs also give notice of penalties, noting, "Criminal copyright infringement is investigated by the
FBI and may constitute a Felony with a maximum penalty of up to five years in prison and or a
$20,000.00 fine." Id. para. 34.
17 Id.paras. 31-32, 37. Such uses might include the reproduction, performance, or display of
the materials in an academic environment. Id. para. 32. The FBI says its anti-piracy warning is
"just getting started" and will soon appear "on a lot of different kinds of goods." F.B.I., The AntiPiracy Warning Seal, http://www.fbi.gov/ipr/ (last visited May 22, 2008). In the meantime, the FBI
is allowing anyone to use a non-specific warning for copyrighted material. !-d. The current warning
omits any reference to exhibiting copyrighted material, and specifically includes non-commercial
infringement: "Warning: The unauthorized reproduction or distribution of this copyrighted work is
illegal.
Criminal copyright infringement, including infringement without monetary gain, is
investigated by the FBI and is punishable by up to 5 years in federal prison and a fine of $250,000."

Id.
18 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 39-42.
19 Id.para. 67.
20 Id. paras. 46-49 (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER

& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1 (2007)) (noting that Nimmer's text not only references applicable fair use statutes in its copyright
statement, but also explicitly endorses a balance between copyright protection and public use).
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balance of fair use rights and copyright protection. Presently, corporate copyright
warnings have left consumers uninformed about the outer limits of infringing use.
One of the byproducts of the mass uncertainty has been the spread of "copyright
myths," such as the idea that nonprofit use does not require permission, or that
21
playing less than thirty seconds of music is acceptable fair use.
Section I of this comment provides some background regarding the complaints
levied against the professional sports league, motion picture, and publishing
businesses, and outlines three relevant areas of copyright law: fair use, the
idea/expression dichotomy, and copyright misuse. Section II provides an analysis of
the effectiveness of these legal approaches to the problem and focuses on the doctrine
of copyright misuse as a solution.
Finally, section III addresses whether a
substantial problem even exists, and proposes ways for users and the Government to
scale back overly aggressive copyright warnings, while ensuring copyright holders
receive the full legal protection to which they are entitled.

I. BACKGROUND: THE USES AND LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
This section introduces the complex legal and social problems associated with
misleading copyright warnings. Part A sets forth the procedural framework for U.S.
copyright law and the CCIA's complaint to the FTC. Part B explains the fair use
doctrine. Part C addresses public confusion over copyright law in general, with
emphasis on the fair use doctrine in particular. Part D reviews the idea/expression
dichotomy in copyright law. Lastly, Part E considers the concept of copyright misuse.

A. CCIA Uses Defense for Offense
At the core of the argument between the challenged media companies and critics
like the CCIA is a question of copyright "balance." The copyright clause in the U.S.
Constitution sets a fair balance by flatly securing authors' exclusive rights in their
works in return for disseminating their works to the public. 22 However, the current

crop of copyright warnings tilts that balance in favor of copyright holders over
copyright users.
Procedurally, once an author receives a federal certificate of registration, the
author's copyright is presumptively valid. 23 Should the author then sue an accused

infringer and demonstrate unauthorized copying of the author's protected work, the
burden shifts to the accused. 24 The accused then bears the responsibility of
persuading a court why an exception should be made to the author's copyright

21 Eg., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other i nds of Users: a Fair Use Doctrine for
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 168 (2001); Dennis M. Kennedy, Key Legal Concerns in ECommerce: The Law Comes to the New Frontier, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 17, 32 (2001); see also
Jessica Litman, Essay: CopyrightAs Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1991).
22 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006).
24 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007); BUC Int'l Corp. v.
Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1142 (11th Cir. 2007).
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protection, or why the author never had protection as to the aspects of his or her
work that the infringer took.
In this sense, the CCIA has created a copyright defense while taking the offense
via FTC regulations against deceptive and unfair trade practices. 25 As discussed
below, there are at least three significant legal doctrines an accused infringer can
invoke against the problem of copyright misrepresentation and overprotection: fair
use, idea/expression, and copyright misuse. Common to all these doctrines is that
they are a defense to copyright infringement. Once a copyright holder has put
forward a case of prima facie infringement, in other words, the infringer may be able
to rely on one of these three defenses and be excused by the courts.
The CCIA's complaint to the FTC is grounded in such defenses. The complaint
alleges the six named companies have engaged in deceptive and unfair trade
practices, violating Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a).26 These companies' copyright warnings are deceptive because they are "likely
to mislead consumers" into believing copyright defenses do not exist or do not apply,
and so consumers are persuaded to forego uses of the protected works that may be
entirely permitted under federal law. 27 For example, the fair use defense has been
explicitly incorporated into the copyright law as a non-infringing use. 28 Hence, it is
deceptive for movie studios to assert that "anY' unauthorized use constitutes
infringement punishable by civil and criminal penalties. 29 Similarly, the copyright
warnings are unfair because they intimidate consumers into forgoing such legally
permitted uses, and because they attempt to withdraw consumers' rights to make
such uses, contrary to the Constitution, Congress and public policy. 30 Taken at face
value, these warnings seem to extinguish many longstanding and statutorilyenshrined defenses to copyright infringement.
As in other areas of civil litigation, a potential defendant to a copyright
infringement action may take the offense by seeking a declaratory judgment that its
actions constitute fair use or fall under another affirmative defense. 3 1 In a similar
way, the CCIA has taken the offense by asking the FTC to rule against the onerous
copyright warnings. In essence, the CCIA seeks a judgment that consumers can still
legally make certain unauthorized uses of the companies' protected works, and that
the companies' warnings do not overcome consumers' statutory and equitable
defenses to copyright infringement.
Copyright law already favors the copyright holder over the consumer through its
grant of exclusive rights to the holder, and because procedurally the consumer must
prove his or her "innocence" as to infringement.
The complained of copyright
warnings threaten to tip over this balance by misleading and intimidating consumers
into thinking they have no rights at all, except for those limited allowances the
companies deign to grant them.

25
26

15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
Id.; CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 56, 61.

CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 52-56.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
29 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 28.
30 Id. paras. 57-61.
31 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Buddyusa, Inc. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 52, 54
(2d Cir. 2001); Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
27
28
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B. The FairUse Doctrine
The CCIA's complaint accuses sports and media companies of trying to expunge
consumers' fair use rights.3 2 As its name implies, the fair use doctrine lets
consumers bypass copyright protection for certain socially useful purposes.
United States copyright law balances exclusive rights and the advancement of
human intellect.33 Authors deserve compensation for their efforts.3 4 In return, the
American public is allowed to reap the benefits of creative and hardworking
constituents.3 5 The various exemptions limiting the protections afforded to copyright
holders are central to this balance.36 The doctrine of "fair use" represents a
longstanding and significant restriction on copyright holders' unrestrained control
over their copyrighted materials. 37 However, at the same time, the extent of the
doctrine's effect and magnitude is imprecise, thus resulting in lingering confusion
38
over its application.

CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 24.
L. Clark, DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct: Can It Take Down InternetInfringers, 6
COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 193, 1967 (2002); see also Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998: A ProposedAmendment to Accommodate Free Speech, 5 COMM. L. & POLY
61, 64-65 (2000) (describing copyright law "in reality" as a balance between content owners and
distribution industries, not creators and public interest). See generally Dotan Oliar, Making Sense
of the IntellectualPropertyClause: Promotion ofProgressas a Limitation on Congresss Intellectual
Property Power 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1781-84 (2006) (outlining four major readings of the Copyright
Clause, and relative contributions of the clause's two principles); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Striking the
correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.").
34 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). The Eldred court described the economic
philosophy embodied by the Copyright Clause as "the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors." Id. Thus, "copyright law celebrates the profit motive" and recognizes that "the incentive
to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit" through the
proliferation of knowledge. Id. In this way the two goals are not mutually exclusive: "copyright law
serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones." Id.
35 d.at 211-12 (describing the Copyright Clause as "both a grant of power and a limitation"
(quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966))); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating copyright's primary objective is to promote scientific progress, not
reward authors' labor).
'3 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006) (allowing libraries to copy materials without permission for archival
and other scholarly purposes, as long as it is on a noncommercial basis); 17 U.S.C. § 109 (codifying
the first sale doctrine, allowing people to borrow or sell copyrighted materials they own, highlighting
music in particular); see Nicola Lucchi, Intellectual PropertyRights in DigitalMedia, 53 BUFFALO
L. REV. 1111, 1120-28 (2005); William Patry, La La and Section 109, Mar. 8, 2006,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/03/la-la-and-section-109.html;
see also 17 U.S.C. § 110
(allowing performances and displays for face to face teaching purposes, distance learning, religious
services, and certain nonprofit performances).
37 Michael B. Weitman, FairUse in Trademark in the Post-KP Permanent World, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 1665, 1694 (2006). See generallyMarshall A. Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 46970 (4th ed. 2005) (describing fair use as "by far the most important defense to an action for copyright
infringement").
38 E.g., Hofheinz v. AMC Prods. Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ([P]otential
infringers of plaintiffs copyrighted works ... are likely to seek a license to avoid entering the murky
realm of fair use law during the course of litigation."). The "Frequently Asked Questions" page of
the U.S. Copyright Office website contains this succinct statement: "The distinction between 'fair
32

'3 David
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Fair use allows for certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted material without
the liability associated with infringement.3 9 The concept of fair use was judicially
created 40 before its codification in the Copyright Act of 1976.41 As a result, its
42
contours and limits remain unsettled.
When determining whether a given use of material infringes a copyright or could
instead be considered legally acceptable fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 lists four factors to
consider: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
amount and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) effect on the value of the
copyrighted work. 43 Generally, the most important aspect of the purpose factor is
whether the new use is "transformative." 44 The more transformative the new use,
the less weight is given to the remaining factors. 45 Among the four factors, the last
one (effect on market value) has proven particularly contentious. 46 Courts must
consider not only the current effect of an infringing use, but also its potential impact
on later demand for the copyrighted work. 47 At the same time, the importance of the
48
four factors can be overstated.
use' and infringement may be unclear and not easily defined." U.S. Copyright Office-Fair Use,
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (last visited April 17, 2008).
3) 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.., scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.").
40 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see also Dan Rosen, A
Common Lawfor the Ages oflntllectualProprty,38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769, 779-85 (1984) (arguing
that courts have interpreted common law as the most capable institution for updating fair use and
copyright protection in the face of new technologies).
41 17 U.S.C. § 107; Neela Kartha, DigitalSampling and CopyrightLaw in a Social Context, 14
U. MIAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 218, 231 (1997).
2
4 Pierre N. Leval, Towarda FairUse Standard,103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-07 (1990).
43 17 U.S.C. § 107.
41 L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938 (9th Cir. 2002); Kartha, supra note
41, at 231. A transformative work "does not 'merely supersede the objects of the original creation'
but rather 'adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message."' Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1164
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
45 L.A. News, 305 F. 3d at 938. Sony Corp. ofAmer>a v. Universal City Studios is an exception
that does not necessarily prove the rule, wherein the Supreme Court held that private, in-home
taping of television programs constituted a fair use. 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). See also Sheila Zoe
Lofgren Collins, Sharing Television Through the Internet: Why the Courts Should Find Fair Use
and WhyIt MayBe a Moot Point,7 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 79, 103 (2006) (arguing that unlike
music-sharing, downloading and uploading television programming through the Internet should be
considered fair use). But see Laura G. Lape, TransformingFair Use: The Productive Use Factorin
Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 699-705 (1995) (presenting an overview and criticism of the
transformative use element).
46 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-68 (1985); Haochen
Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 267, 290-91
(2007).
47 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). In particular, courts must evaluate
"whether unrestricted and widespread conduct" of the use in question "would result in a
substantially adverse impact" for the original work. Id.
48 David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All" and Other Fairv Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 264, 280-82 (2000). Nimmer's comprehensive analysis of copyright cases since
1994 indicates there is little correspondence between valuations of the four categories (at least as
espoused by Congress) and courts' decisions on fair use cases. Id. "Basically," Nimmer comments,
"had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the
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NFL telecasts warn that "any other use" of its product, including "descriptions,
or accounts of the game" are prohibited. 49 MLB likewise asserts that "accounts and
descriptions of this game may not be disseminated without express written
52
consent." 50 As the CCIA argues, 51 such blanket statements are legally inaccurate.
53
First, the "bundle" of rights granted to copyright holders is discrete and limited.
Second, 17 U.S.C. § 107 explicitly provides for numerous uses that do not constitute
copyright infringement, including "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching" and
scholarly work. 54 At the very least, "water cooler" discussion of the latest game is
permissible, as are the journalistic endeavors that have sustained sports columnists
55
for years.
Motion picture DVDs frequently contain similarly broad claims 56 and thus, also
run afoul of the specific exemptions embodied in U.S. copyright law. 5' Movie reviews,
for example, routinely use verbatim clips of the associated subject matter. 58 Such
uses are plainly "transformative" under § 107 because they inject new meaning into
59
the movies in question.
Despite these seemingly obvious examples of copyright overreach, fair use can be
precarious grounds for consumers. Fair use is an affirmative defense, meaning it
only comes into play once a copyright holder has established a prima facie case of

Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be the same." Id. at 280. See also Barton Beebe,
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT FAIR USE CASES, 1978-2005 (2007),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Beebe.pdf (confirming Nimmer's hypothesis
that judges conform the four factors to the outcome of the test).
41)
CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 29.
50 Id. para. 22.
51Id.para. 18 (claiming such representations "materially misrepresent U.S. copyright law").
52 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (stating copyright
protection "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work").
53' 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Copyright owners have the exclusive rights to: (1) reproduce their
work; (2) prepare derivative works based upon their copyrighted work; (3) distribute copies of the
work to the public by sale, rental, lease or lending; (4) perform the work in public; (5) display it
publicly; (6)perform it publicly by means of digital audio transmission
1d; N.Y. Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495-96 (2001); see also Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433 (holding that a copyright
grants exclusive rights in "five qualified ways").
54 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Leval, supra note 42, at 1110 (stating four statutory factors 'do not
represent a score card that promises victory to the winner of the majority.' Rather, each factor is 'to
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."' (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994)). Thus the Court should mind its purpose to
encourage "creative activity" for the public good. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429.
55 Patrick Ross
Blogs
on
CCIA
complaint, IPCENTRAL,
Aug.
1,
2007,
http://weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/2007/08/patrick-ross-bl.html.
56 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 28.
57

17 U.S.C. § 107.

Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm"t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003).
("The movie reviewer does not simply display a scene from the movie under review but as well
provides his or her own commentary and criticism."); see, e.g., At the Movies with Ebert & Roeper,
http://bventertainment.go.com/tv/buenavista/ebertandroeper/.
5) Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006)
("If the secondary use adds value to the original... [if it is used as raw material, and] transformed
in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the
very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.").
5S
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infringement.6 0 Thus, only after being haled into court can a user learn whether his
or her use of copyrighted material was legally acceptable.
Judge Richard Posner and others support the notion of this judicially
constructed fair use exception. 61 They argue that the contours of fair use should be
left intentionally vague in order to accommodate change, particularly in new
technologies.6 2 The new technology concern is legitimate. 63 Nevertheless, vagueness
and uncertainty can create trepidation among users uncertain of their rights. For
example, an educator may justifiably be confused about the amount of copyrighted
material he or she may permissibly include in his or her daily lessons.6 4 A rational
response would be to avoid the entire question altogether and simply remove any
65
questionable material.
There are clear virtues to such an exception-based copyright regime. 66 Among
other benefits, it allows consumers themselves to determine what may constitute
"fair use" rather than leaving the decision to the judges or Congress. At the same
time, it fosters a "permission culture," in which users do not know whether their
approach is legally permissible until a court rules on it-potentially a lengthy and
67
expensive process.

C. Layperson Confusion About Copyrightand Fair Use
One of the main aspects of the CCIA's complaint lies in public perception of fair
use. 68 Underlying its complaint is a worry that overzealous and misleading copyright
warnings, combined with the cumulative effect of countless viewings, may leave the
public confused about the balance of legitimate rights and uses under copyright

(30
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
(31William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
Eldred,92 CALIF. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2004) ("[L]ike most judge-made doctrines, the fair use defense
is flexible. Judges made it and judges can adapt it to changed conditions.").
G2 Jd
63 See generally Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting
the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 429-32 (discussing the
Supreme Court's recognition of public benefit rationale for copyright protection).
61 Cathy
Newsome,
A
Teacher's
Guide
to
Fair
Use
and
Copyright,
http://home.earthlink.net/-cnew/research.htm (last visited May 22, 2008) ("It is no wonder that in
this environment teachers often do not understand just how much leeway they have in using other
people's work. The law may seem confusing, ambiguous, and unclear.").
(5John Eggerton, NBC U. Copyright Warning Complaint is Frivolous, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6464843.html.
66 See, e.g., The Copyright Term Extension Act: Hearing on S. 483 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary,104th Cong. 42 (1997) (prepared statement of Jack Valenti). Valenti argued, "Whatever
work is not owned is a work that no one protects and preserves" and no one will "invest the funds for
enhancement because there is no longer an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that
anyone can offer for sale." Id. In short, "a public domain work is an orphan... everyone exploits its
use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues." I-d.
Such a decline in film quality would hardly benefit consumers, Valenti concluded. Id.
(37
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 162 (Penguin Press 2004).
(G8
CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 4.
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law. 69 Rigorous public opinion data is sparse, but anecdotal evidence suggests many
people-including academics, artists and other creators of content-misperceive the
doctrine of fair use. 70 In a recent survey, 71 over half of respondents said they do not
understand what constitutes permissible use of copyrighted materials.7 2 The survey
administrators further suggested that a false sense of self-confidence likely inflated
even this figure, noting a significant gap between what respondents thought they
73
knew about copyright and the actual law.
In a larger survey perfbrmed by the Brennan Center for Justice, almost all
74
respondents had at least heard of fair use as a defense to copyright infringement.
The vast majority said they relied on fair use when deciding to borrow, reproduce, or
quote another's work.75 However, even among this apparently informed and active
pool of respondents, many admittedly possessed only "a vague sense" of what fair use
actually means or mistakenly thought the law placed a numerical limit on the
amount of copyrighted material falling within the ambit of the doctrine. 76 Moreover,
such surveys only include individuals who have already attempted to work around
obstacles posed by copyright law. 77 The surveys do not account for those whose
confusion or doubt about fair use convinces them that their own copyright problems
are insurmountable, and who instead choose to forego such projects entirely.78

(3 Kirk Biglione, Warning.*Those Copyright Warnings May Not Be EntirelyAccurate, Aug. 2,
2007,
http://www.medialoper.com/hot-topics/copyright/warning-those -copyright-warnings - may-notbe-entirely-accurate/.
70Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness-Is Congress Making a
Scarecrow of the Law, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 44 (2002); Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, The Good,
the Bad, and the Confusing. User Generated Video Creators on Copyright, CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA,
Apr. 3, 2007, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/good bad confusing.pdf.
71 Aufderheide, supra note 70, at 6. The non-random survey included fifty-one participants.

Id. at 2.
72 Id.

73Id
71Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Will Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of
Copyright Control, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, 46 (2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download file 9056.pdf.
75Id. at 54.
76 Id.
77
d. at 21-25.
78Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights
Clearance

Culture

for Documentary Filmmakers, CTR.

FOR

SOCIAL

MEDIA,

20

(2004),

http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/untoldstories-report.pdf ("[P]erhaps the greatest area
of loss is unknown ...[filmmakers] do not even attempt films that pose large rights hurdles.");
Renee Hobbs, Peter Jaszi & Pat Aufderheide, The Cost of Copyright Confusion for Media Literacy,
CTR.

FOR

SOCIAL

MEDIA,

16-20

(2007),

http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/

finalCSM copyright report.pdf; ef Thomas Rogers & Andrew Szamosszegi, Fair Use in the US.
Economy, CAPITAL TRADE, 8 (2007), http://www.ccianet.org/artmanager/uploads/1/FairUseStudy

Sep 12.pdf ("[A]bout one out of every eight workers in the United States is employed in an industry
that benefits from the protection afforded by fair use.").
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D. The Idea/ExpressionDichotomy
The CCIA also challenges attempts by sports and media companies to prevent
79
the public from meaningfully discussing the basic facts and ideas in their products.
Whereas fair use allows for the unauthorized use of copyrighted material in certain
circumstances, some original works or authorship remain completely outside the
reach of copyright protection.80 For example, ideas, facts, and universal truths (e.g.
mathematical proofs) normally lie outside the realm of copyright.8 1 Hence, under a
principle called the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, although copyright
law protects an author's original expression, it "encourages others to build freely
8
upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."

2

The determinative issue under this doctrine is often one of facts. "Facts do not
owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and
discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence."8 3 Thus, all facts, whether
scientific, historical, or derived from another source, are "part of the public domain
available to every person."8 4 For example, reporting the score of a baseball game is
not copyrightable.8 5 Likewise, as MLB learned in C.B. C. Distribution& Marketing v.
Major League BaseballAdvanced Media, L.P., 6 professional baseball players' names
and their statistics as used in fantasy games "are factual information which is
otherwise available in the public domain. .. "87 However, the particular format and
description of a baseball game, or a unique compilation of player data-involving
88
statistical averages, graphical representations, and so forth-could be copyrighted.

79 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 25.

80E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
81 Id. ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.") But see
Edward Samuels, The Idea -ExpressionDichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 409-10
(1989). For example, although the idea-expression dichotomy might be relevant to weighing the
infringement of a non-literal copy, it "would not be particularly helpful in the case of an exact copyby definition an exact copy is copied literally, and thus clearly includes expression as well as idea."
Id. at 375.
82 Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985)); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219 (2003). Because of this idea/ expression distinction, "every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted
work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication." Id. at 219.
8:3Feist,499 U.S. at 347-48; N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 497
F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007).
84 Feist,499 U.S. at 348.
85 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d
1077, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affidon other grounds, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (not addressing the
copyright preemption issue because of its finding that CBC's First Amendment rights superseded
the players' state law rights of publicity).
8 Id.
87 Id. at 1102.
Such use involves only "historical facts about the baseball players," such as
batting averages and home runs. Id. at 1190-91.
88 See also NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding game broadcasts
copyrightable because of "authorship" of cameramen and directors, but not scores and other facts
obtainable from broadcasts or game arena itself).
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Thus, the idea/expression doctrine does not permit one to freely reproduce
another's original work of authorship if that work contains expressive elements, such
as context or format, regardless of the unprotectable facts or ideas that are contained
therein.8 9
Accordingly, making or distributing an unauthorized complete
reproduction also falls outside this defense if the work contains expressive
elements. 90
The warnings embodied in the CCIA's complaint stretch beyond mere facts or
ideas. 91 For example, insofar as copyright law prohibits any accounts, descriptions,
reproductions, retransmissions, pictures or dissemination, 92 the protection is
dependent on original compilation, context, and layout (i.e., expressions) rather than
facts and ideas. 93 The exact reproduction of a game, movie, or book might be
prohibited, but an account or story about it, told from one fan to another, is safely
outside the realm of copyright protection. 94 By sweepingly prohibiting descriptions or
accounts of their games, the NFL and MLB's copyright warnings plainly contradict
95
this principle of the fact/expression dichotomy.
The idea/expression dichotomy supports the notion that copyright law is
compatible with First Amendment principles of free speech. 96 The dichotomy strikes
a balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act "by permitting free
97
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression."
Consequently, the "built-in First Amendment accommodations" of copyright law
protects free speech by ensuring that copyright holders do not gain monopolies over
entire concepts and thoughts. 98 Nevertheless, defining legally explicit boundaries
between such Platonic ideals and practical reality can be quite difficult. 99

89 See Pazienza v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 921 F. Supp. 1274, 1275-77 (D.N.J. 1995). But ec
Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing instances of
"inevitable," mechanical, or natural ordering of facts that are devoid of creativity, and therefore noncopyrightable).
90 Soo, e.g., NFL v. Primetime 24, 211 F.3d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Penguin Books
U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., 96 Civ. 4126 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10394, at *36-41 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2000) (rejecting a fact-based defense where defendants
copied verbatim an entire 488-page workbook and complete sections of another book).
91 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para 25.
92 Id. para. 20, 22.
93 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg.
v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1101 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
94 Samuels, supra note 81, at 375 and accompanying text.
95 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 20, 22.
96 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
The Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment were adopted close in time, which, like the idea/expression dichotomy, provides strong
support that they are compatible. Id.
97 Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
98 Id.

99 Robert Kasunic, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright: Preserving the Traditional
Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 397, 401-04 (2007). Although the idea/expression
dichotomy seems straightforward enough, there is often "no reliable way to distinguish between a
work's ideas and the expression of those ideas." Id. at 401. This uncertainty may lead to
infringement claims that are difficult to disprove. Id. Moreover, such uncertainty can have a
chilling effect on speech that is "not necessarily limited to risk-averse users of copyrighted works."
Id.; see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("Nobody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.").
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E. CopyrightMisuse
Taken as a whole, the CCIA's complaint expresses the nascent idea of copyright
misuse, in that the media companies should not be allowed to sue infringers when
the companies themselves are making overbroad or legally insupportable copyright
claims. 100 Derived from the analogous defense in patent law, copyright misuse offers
a defense in the form of a plaintiffs "unclean hands." 10 1 The maxim of unclean hands
"closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith
relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the
behavior of the defendant." 10 2 In patent law, the term has been interpreted as an
unlawful expansion of patent rights and is closely related to antitrust issues.1 03 As
10 4
applied to copyright law, the doctrine has similarly developed along antitrust lines,
but has also spawned a parallel course of analysis pertaining to the public policy
105
underlying copyright law.
106
Particularly since the seminal case of Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,
many courts have begun to recognize copyright misuse as a safe harbor alternative to
otherwise infringing acts. 10 7 Despite this increased judicial acceptance, the misuse
defense remains in the minority.10 8 Although Lasercomb may no longer be construed
as the "exceptional case,"1 09 most courts evaluating copyright misuse have
interpreted Lasercomb narrowly, primarily focusing on the antitrust aspects of the
defense. 110 Copyright misuse also remains only a defense to infringement, rather
than a "free-standing offense" itself.1

100 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 57.
101 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
102 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945).
103 Ben Sheffner, Berkeley Technology Law JournalAnnual Review of Law and Technology, 15
BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 25, 32-33, 42-43 (2000); 4 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 13.09(A)(2)(a).
101Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979).
105 Sean Michael Aylward, The Fourth Circuit's Extension of the Misuse Doctrine to the Area of
Copyright:A Miuse of the Miuse Doetrine 17 DAYTON L. REV. 661, 675 (1992).
106 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Lasercomb court separated copyright misuse from
violations of antitrust law. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. Setting aside antitrust issues, the court
specifically focused on a newly determinative question: "whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright?" Id.
107 E.g., id. at 978-79; Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997);
DSC Commc'ns. Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (supporting strongly the reasoning behind a
copyright misuse defense based on public policy, but concluding "this case does not require us to
decide whether the federal copyright law permits a misuse defense").
108 Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: The
Enforceabilty of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM. L. & POL'Y 37, 87 (2007) (reporting nine federal
circuits have not adopted copyright misuse, nor has the Supreme Court approved its extension
beyond antitrust policy).
109 4 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 13.09[A] (2003)).
110 Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the PublicPolicy Rationale of Copyright.*Reconsidering

Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 565, 586-87 (2006).
111 4 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 13.09(A)(2)(b) ("It has been held that there is no such freestanding offense, apart from stating a cognizable claim under the antitrust laws.").
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The CCIA explicitly incorporates principles of fair use and the idea/expression
dichotomy into its complaint.112 As a non-codified and infrequently tested doctrine,
copyright misuse represents a much weaker basis for FTC action. However, it is an
important element to consider because of its potential impact in the courts. Fair use
and idea/expression can offer a robust defense, but basically only to one defendant at
a time, on a case-by-case basis. Copyright misuse, on the other hand, could have far
more sweeping effects. If the sports, media, and publishing companies named in the
CCIA's complaint proved unable to enforce their copyrights because of misuse, the
effects could carry over to all their suits against infringers. Since the companies
would surely move swiftly to redress the warnings that give rise to determinations of
misuse, this doctrine may prove especially well-suited to upsetting decades of overly
aggressive copyright warnings.

II. ANALYSIS: COPYRIGHT WARNINGS As COPYRIGHT MISUSE
A successful outcome to the CCIA's legal initiative could herald a significant
shift in the respective burdens of copyright holders and the public. This section
weighs the potential for judicial legal doctrines to affect copyright warnings, as well
as the potential ramifications of a shift in copyright balance. Part A considers
copyright misuse as a strong avenue for success. Part B addresses the possible
results of that success.

A. CopyrightMisuse:A JudicialRebalancingOption
The doctrine of copyright misuse may offer an opportunity for limiting the dire
warnings set forth by the CCIA.113 This defense prevents a culpable copyright holder
from successfully suing for infringement of a misused copyright. 114 If the sports and
entertainment companies persist in overstating their rights, their legal options
115
against infringers could be drastically reduced.
Attacking the copyright warnings on grounds of a copyright misuse defense
necessarily means standing on fair use and idea/expression grounds. 116 As the CCIA
argues, the warnings are overbroad1 17 because, in addition to warning against
infringing uses of the material, they warn against permissible uses, such as a fair use
112

See CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 24-25.

11: See generally Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1658-59 (arguing that where copyright

warning "grossly and intentionally exaggerates" copyright holder's rights to the detriment of publicdomain publishers, the case for invoking doctrine of copyright misuse "seems to us compelling").
III Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990); ci Vogue Ring
Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 616 (D.R.I. 1976) (determining false and misleading
copyright warning alone may not be sufficient for copyright misuse, but should be considered in
conjunction with other factors).
115 But see also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 n.22 (noting the court's holding does not invalidate
Lasercomb's copyright, and Lasercomb is free to bring suit for infringement "once it has purged
itself of the misuse").
116 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
117 E.g., CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 1. The NFL explicitly prohibits "any other use" of
its telecast, except its audience's "private use." (emphasis added). Id. para. 20.
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of the material, or using only those portions of the material that receive no copyright
protection, i.e., non-expressive aspects.118
The warnings encompass so many
potential uses of the companies' material that they hinder the public's ability to make
any meaningful use of the material, contrary to the purposes of copyright law. 119
120
Consequently, this overbroad restriction constitutes misuse.
In practice, courts have applied the copyright misuse doctrine sparingly and
with mixed results. 121 In particular, federal courts have been somewhat reluctant to
acknowledge a copyright misuse defense that does not rely upon anticompetitive
formulations. 122 Nevertheless, a few notable decisions support the direction of the
CCIA's complaint.123
In QAD, Inc. v. ALNAssociates, Inc., 124 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found copyright misuse where a software maker sought
enforcement of its copyright on material that exceeded the scope of the company's
actual copyright.1 25 Plaintiff QAD had "updated" or derived its product from earlier
Hewlett-Packard software, in which it did not hold a copyright. 126 This was an
"improper extension and overstatement of QAD's copyrights." 127 Due to this misuse,
the court prevented QAD from enforcing its copyright on that derived product against
the defendant. 128 The court rooted its decision not in antitrust issues, but rather in
the "public purpose behind the granting of the copyright," which it defined as
129
promoting progress in the software field.
In Video Pipeline,Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment,130 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled against a distributor's effort to prove copyright
misuse.131 Video Pipeline had a license agreement with The Walt Disney Company
("Disney") to compile movie trailers for home video retailers. 132 Video Pipeline
subsequently put its trailers online, a use that Disney said violated the license
agreement. 133 Video Pipeline argued it had made fair use of Disney's copyrighted
Id.para. 25.
119See Eldred,537 U.S. at 219.
120 See, e.g., QAD, Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (observing
copyright protection must be perceived in terms of public purpose behind granting copyright, i.e.
"promoting progress").
121 Ekstrand, supra note 110, at 578-86. Ekstrand discusses thirty-two cases since Lasercomb,
in which few defendants successfully asserted copyright misuse. Id.
122 Se genoerally 4 NIMMER, supra note 20, § 13.09(B) (2007) (noting that courts only rarely
recognize the copyright misuse defense, such as when plaintiffs transgression is particularly
serious).
123 Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt.
Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997).
124 770 F. Supp. 1261.
118

125

Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
ITd. at

1267.

1263-64.
1266.
128
1266-67. The court found plaintiff QAD's misuse especially egregious: "Itused its
copyright to sue ALN and to restrain it from the use of material over which QAD itself had no
rights. That is a misuse of both the judicial process and the copyright laws." Id.
126

127

129

Id. at 1265.

130

342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).

131

ITd. at 206.
ITd. at 194-95.
Id.at 195.

132
133
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films, and further, that Disney's online licenses misused copyright law to suppress
criticism. 134 The court rejected the copyright misuse defense, determining the public
could still find criticism of Disney online apart from the licensed websites. 13 5 Still,
the court unambiguously extended the patent misuse doctrine to copyright and
prospectively opened the door to future litigation. 13 6 The court speculated that a
copyright holder could misuse its copyright to restrain another's "creative expression"
137
independent of antitrust, fair use, or idea/expression issues.
In Assessment Teehnologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 138 Judge Richard
Posner incorporated an idea/expression balance into copyright misuse. 139 In that
case, the defendant WIREdata sought raw data that was collected by Wisconsin
140
municipalities, but compiled and sorted by the plaintiff Assessment Technologies.
Judge Posner justified extending copyright misuse beyond antitrust in instances
where copyright owners use infringement suits "to obtain property protection... that
copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an
outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal
sophistication to resist effectively." 141 Thus, he construed such tactics to be an abuse
142
of process.
A concern for fairness lies at the heart of the copyright clause. Exclusive rights
are not granted to the copyright holder simply as a gold star for originality, or to lock
out everyone but the first author of an idea. Copyright exists specifically to further
the "useful Arts" and encourage their development. 143 It would therefore be unfair,
and a misuse, to allow copyright to "be asserted improperly to inhibit other persons'
144
freedom of expression."
Potential infringers of the CCIA's alleged misusers might justly claim similar
protections as these cases. The "raw data" allowed in Assessment Teehnologies 45 is
analogous to the raw statistics of professional athletes and sports teams, which are
not normally copyrightable. 146 Similar to QAD, creative artists and educators
frequently seek to use copyrighted books and DVDs, sometimes indirectly, to enlarge
their fields of endeavor. 147
For example, creators of "fan fiction" often use
copyrighted characters and media to create remarkably new and imaginative artistic
134
135
136

137
1
139
140

Jd. at 203.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 205.
350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 643.

111Id. at 647.

Id.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
M QAD Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
145 Asessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 647.
146 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d
1077, 1101 (E.D. Mo. 2006). The C.B.C. court held baseball statistics that are facts, even if part of a
compilation, are not copyrightable as they are not original, only reportable. Id.
147 See, e.g., Posting of Judge Richard Posner to Lessig Copyright Blog, Fair Use and Mis use,
142

143

http://essig.org/blog/2004/08/fair use and misuse.html (August 24, 2004) (citing Jeffrey Rosen,
Mouse Trap, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 28, 2002, at 12) (recounting story of a filmmaker

accidentally capturing three seconds of a television program and finding copyright restrictions
prohibitive).
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works. 148 Courts might find such creations outside the boundaries of fair use, strictly
speaking, but still see an interest in acknowledging their development of a genre or
149
fictional form.
As suggested by Video Pipeline,artists, critics and parodists could do much with
multimedia samples proscribed by NBC, Dreamworks, and other companies'
warnings. 150 In the YouTube era, for instance, video "mashups" and internet remixes
frequently combine copyrighted materials from different sources in new and
unexpected ways. 151 Such user-generated content not only adds new meaning to the
1 52
existing material, but can represent entirely new media for creative expression.
Declaring all such works off-limits flies in the face of copyright law's explicit goals
and might be considered a misuse.
The antitrust rationale for misuse does not readily apply to the copyright
warnings at issue here. After Lasercomb, the misuse defense has typically been
invoked when one company uses its copyright to force purchasers or receivers to use
only that company's product instead of a competitor's. In this instance, the pattern is
reversed. The sports and entertainment companies generally do not seek inclusion or
exclusion of competitors' products unless it enhances the usefulness of their own
products, such as in a satellite rebroadcast of an NFL game. 153 Instead, the
companies seek to exclude all other possible uses for their own product, thereby
giving it the narrowest functionality. In such instances, copyright misuse must rely
on the public policy justification for the "unclean hands" rule. 154 That is to say,
courts should only enforce copyright protections for companies whose hands are not
"dirtied" by attempts to extend their copyrights beyond what the law and equity
permit.
Finally, it is worth noting that copyright misuse, like fair use, is a defense to
copyright infringement rather than an affirmative claim itself. 155 Even if successful,
it is a tool available only to defendants who find themselves defending an
infringement claim. 1 56 Courts have not recognized it as an independent cause of
action, and have not based damages or injunctions on its assertion. 157
148 Meredith McCardle, Fan Fiction,Fandom, and Fanfare: What's All the Fuss2 9 B.U. J. Sci.
& TECH.L. 433, 450-63 (2003).
19 Id. at 445. A fan's story drawing directly on material from a movie or book, such as
characters, plot, or locations, would likely be open to infringement charges. Id at 451.
150Cf Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003)
(comparing a mere copy of a two-minute movie segment to a reviewer clip, complete with added
commentary and criticism).
151Sarah Trombley, Visions and Revisions: Fanvids and Fair Use, 25 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 647, 658 (2007).
152 See Edward Lee,
Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1116671.
153 NFL v. Primetime 24, 211 F.3d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 2000).
154 See generallyDallon, supra note 63, at 426-36 (outlining how the U.S. Constitution, courts,
and Congress historically embraced public benefit rationale for copyright protection).
155Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10440,
at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005); Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp.
2d 11, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2004).
156 See also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he defense
of copyright misuse is available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by the
misuse.").
157 See Open Source Yoga Unity,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10440, at *25-27.
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B. Amplifying CopyrightMisuse Via CollateralEstoppel
The injunctive effects of copyright misuse make it a stronger method for scaling
back overbroad copyright warnings than other affirmative defenses. First, copyright
misuse does not require the case-by-case analysis needed for defenses like fair use.
Second, through collateral estoppel, defendants to infringement actions can raise the
protection of copyright misuse without depending on the merits of their own various
uses and circumstances.
The open-ended nature of copyright defenses like fair use means they are
15 8
Fair use,
inappropriate as blanket protections against infringement suits.
idea/expression, and other affirmative defenses involve a comparison of a potential
infringer's work to the copyrighted material at issue. The question for a court is
often whether a user has unfairly borrowed from a copyright holder or taken
advantage of its exclusive market rights. 15 9 Such determinations obviously vary
depending on the purposes, implementation and context that different users make of
protected material. 160 For example, the same material that would be infringing when
used for commercial purposes might be fair use for someone without profit-making
motives. 161 Because the focus of judicial inquiry is on the potential infringer, the
results of one case cannot be readily overlaid onto the circumstances of a different
defendant.
By contrast, the copyright misuse doctrine focuses on the unacceptable behavior
of a copyright holder itself.1 62 If a copyright holder is found to be misusing its
copyright protection, it will be unable to enforce its copyright regardless of a
potential infringer's particular use. Since the fault attaches to the copyright holder,
res judicata suggests the misuse should carryover to all other infringement suits by
that holder on the same copyright.
For example, if a media company's copyright warnings make it guilty of misuse
in a suit against one potential infringer, the facts of its suit against a different
infringer should make no difference so long as the company's copyright warning
remains the same. The copyright warnings themselves are the source of misuse, not
the potential infringers' activities. The companies named by the CCIA commonly
issue one universal copyright warning for all products of the same type (DVDs, books,
sports broadcasts, etc.); hence, a single finding of misuse for that warning could spell
defeat for a company on all its other infringement suits involving those products.
Such a prospect gives the companies strong incentive to alter their copyright
warnings, or risk their copyright protections becoming meaningless and
unenforceable.
Following this logic, courts can broadly apply the effects of copyright misuse
through the doctrine of non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel, or "issue
preclusion."1 63 Collateral estoppel serves essentially the same goals as res judicata158 Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1645.
159 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2006).
160 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).
161 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1986).
1 2 Home Design Servs. v. Hibiscus Homes of Fla., Inc., 6:03-cv-1860-Orl-19KRS, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32788, at *39 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2005).
1 3 Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 574 (ist Cir. 2003). "Defensive use of collateral
estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff
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preventing the same claim from being litigated over and over again, in the interest of
fairness and judicial efficiency. 164 Due process nominally prohibits binding a litigant
to the results of a case in which the litigant was not a party or privy. 165 However,
federal courts have long permitted defendants to estop a plaintiff from relitigating an
issue that was already decided against that plaintiff in a prior case. 166 The term
"non-mutual" means a new defendant can invoke collateral estoppel against a
plaintiff even though the defendant was unconnected to the earlier case. 167 In other
words, after losing its case, a plaintiff should not be allowed "two bites from the same
apple" by turning around and suing another defendant for the same issue on which it
168
just lost.
Collateral estoppel is particularly suited to the problem of overreaching
copyright warnings, because the issue would be identical in each case, and the
particulars of a defendant's use are mostly irrelevant.1 69 As outlined in part A, the
copyright misuse defense applies to companies promulgating misleading copyright
warnings. Each infringement suit by one of the CCIA's named companies would
involve the same warning, so the resulting issue of copyright misuse would likewise
be identical in each suit.
Since the misuse in question is entirely on the
companies/plaintiffs' side, the facts of potential infringement have no bearing on the
outcome. 170
Once a court has found misuse by a company, defendants to
infringement suits by that company can simply assert a defense of collateral estoppel.
No further pleadings or defense are theoretically necessary. The company would be
as unable to pursue suits against other infringers as against the defendant who
originally raised the misuse defense.
Collateral estoppel thus stands as an effective means of broadening copyright
misuse for a wide swath of consumers, even though it is only an affirmative
defense. 1 71 Like fair use or copyright misuse, collateral estoppel requires legal
pleading and answering infringement charges. Such affirmative defenses do not
directly redress the copyright imbalance between large media copyright holders and
consumers. After all, the assurance of a successful legal strategy does not necessarily
has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party."
United States v.Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (1984).
161Avins v. Moll, 610 F. Supp. 308, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
165 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).
166Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Bruszewski v. United
States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950); Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F. Supp. 2d 290, 298 (S.D.N.Y.

2002).
167Jasper v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
168EEOC v. Sidley Austin LLP, 437 F.3d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 2006).

169See Robin Singh Educ. Servs. v. Excel Test Prep. Inc., No. 06-20951, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
8178, at *14-19 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2008); Innovad, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Collateral estoppel is permitted where: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the
first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated there; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a
final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the first action. In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir.

2007).
170 See, e.g., Robin Singh, 2008 U.S.
defensive collateral estoppel despite minor
represent similar interests and are in the
litigation).
171 Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470,

App. LEXIS 8178, at *13-15 (applying non-mutual
factual differences, because the parties in new suit
same positions vis-A-vis the same issues in previous
476 (1998).
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make a user less apprehensive about making questionable use of protected material.
The time and expense involved in defending a copyright case could still be a powerful
incentive to not risk stepping over the infringement line. For this reason, a brightline agency or statutory solution remains optimal.
Nevertheless, collateral estoppel could have a potent, indirect influence on the
relative copyright balance. Once misuse is deemed to exist for a given sports, media
or publishing company, that company would face the hard choice of either adjusting
its copyright warnings, or enduring a long string of dismissed infringement suits.
Although reconfiguring warnings would thus not be mandatory, it is doubtful any
prominent copyright holder would choose to give up enforcement of its copyright
protections in this manner.

III. PROPOSALS: THREE BRANCHES FOR REBALANCING COPYRIGHT INTERESTS
Large sports and media companies are routinely disregarding copyright
distinctions, thereby contributing to widespread public misunderstanding of
copyright law and its purposes. 172 This circumstance is reversible. This section first
evaluates the merits of revising copyright warnings. Next, it offers three scenarios
by which the FTC, Congress, and the courts can reconfigure copyright warnings to
better reflect the public interest.

A. A Need for Copyright Warnings?
Copyright warnings in their present form might prove both appropriate and
necessary. Given Americans' reportedly lax attitudes toward copyright today, 173 such
dire and incessant warnings could actually deter some potential viewers from truly
infringing activity. 174 Indeed, the well-documented public uncertainty about fair use,
when combined with the notorious, purportedly well-defined rules promulgated by
175
copyright holders, may plausibly deter would-be infringers.
Furthermore, copyright warnings such as those soundly condemned by the CCIA
have factored into several courts' determinations of infringement. 176 17 U.S.C.
172 Jason Mazzone, Too Quick to Copyright, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 33, available at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/news/mazzone legtimes_2003-11- 17.pdf [hereinafter Mazzone, Too
Quick to Copyright]; Posting of Judge Richard Posner to Lessig Copyright Blog, supra note 147.
173 E.g., James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 231 (citing
surveys showing almost two-thirds of Americans place diminished or no priority on copyright
protection).
171Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1647. Patry and Posner argue that rampant file-sharing
indicates many consumers do not take copyright seriously, and "may therefore be prone to interpret
fair use in extravagant terms if given any excuse to do so". Id.
175 Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence,26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535,

1578 (2005).
176 United States v. Beltran, No. 06-2220, No. 06-2221, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22054, at *3-4
(1st Cir. Sept. 14, 2007); ef United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding
it "not unreasonable" to assume defendant read copyright labels on tapes used with duplicating
machines, and therefore knew he was involved in an illegal operation). But ef United States v.
Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (D. Neb. 1991) (finding defendant not guilty of infringement, despite
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§ 401(d) explicitly provides that a copyright notice obviates a "defense based on
innocent infringement. ' "177 In particular, the presence of copyright warnings may
contribute to a finding of "willful" infringement as specified by 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).178
Finally, insofar as CCIA's complaint and envisioned solution addresses
"consumer rights," it may be initiating a legally insupportable claim. 179 At least one
critic has pointed out that "fair use is not a consumer right," but is rather an
180
affirmative defense.
Establishing fair use as an affirmative right, as impliedly proposed in the CCIA
complaint, would fundamentally alter the copyright landscape.18 1 For example, if fair
use were an affirmative right, then users should be allowed to take positive actions to
exercise it, such as by circumventing copy protections.18 2 For this reason alone,
perhaps, courts have overwhelmingly viewed fair use as an affirmative defense
instead of a "right" per se.18 3 As such, it is applied and evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. 18 4 Applied to our discussion's context, even if millions of downloaders were
sued by MLB for copyright infringement, and even if they all successfully defended
using the fair use doctrine, MLB (and other companies) would still have no particular
duty to rewrite its copyright warnings. The dispersed and particularized impact of
this defense thus suggests the need for a broader statutory solution, as described in
the following section.

the fact he saw FBI copyright warnings on videotapes and even affixed such warning labels to copies
he made, because he mistakenly thought the warning applied to renting public, but not vendors like
himself).
17717 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2006). If a copyright notice appears on the published copy to which
defendant had access, then "no weight shall be given to such a defendant's interposition of a defense
based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages." Id.; see also
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Richardson, 95C0868C, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22117, at *10-11
(W.D. Wis. June 6, 1996) (rejecting defendant's "innocent infringement" defense, because all seized
videotapes at issue bore labels with copyright notices and warnings, or gave copyright warning

statements when played).
178 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); Beltran, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22054, at *3-4. Any person "who
willfully infringes a copyright" faces punishment, including fines and imprisonment. 17 U.S.C. §
506(a)(1).
179CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 1.
180 Patrick Ross, FairUse Is Not a ConsaumerRikht,CNET, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.news.com/
Fair-use-is-not-a-consumer-right/2010-1030_3-6205977.html.
181 Kevin J. Harrang, Distinguished Lecture on Innovation & Communication Poliey.
Challenges in the Global ITMa-rket, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 29, 41-42 (2007).
182 COMMITTEE

ON

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS

IN

THE

EMERGING

INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5 (2000).
183Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
See also Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) and Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79
F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing, in dicta, with a traditional approach and Supreme
Court precedent declaring fair use as an affirmative defense). Courts may also hesitate to find
misuse because of the idea that misuse renders copyrights temporarily unenforceable, which might
seem excessive punishment for a small infraction. Judge, supra note 103, at 904.
184 Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1569.
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B. FTCRewards for Reworded Copyright Warnings
18 5
The most straightforward solution is FTC action, as the CCIA demands.
According to the CCIA complaint, copyright warnings are "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" under the Federal Trade Commission Act.18 6 The warnings mislead users
about their ability to make fair use of copyrighted materials and misrepresent the
187
law.
Critics argue the utility of such warnings outweigh any problems-the warnings
remind people that infringement is a crime,188 prevent illegal activities, and help
stave off copyright lawsuits. 18 9 In short, companies place these warnings on their
materials to combat piracy.
Notwithstanding the companies' efforts, the tactic appears remarkably
unsuccessful. For example, the Motion Picture Association of America claimed a loss
of $6.1 billion to piracy in 2005, and sees it as a growing threat. 190 Insofar as the
warnings intimidate and confuse law-abiding users more than dissuade copyright
191
infringers, the FTC could adjust the warnings to better serve its underlying policy.
Achieving a balance of rights and fair use and providing notice to pirates should
be at the heart of any copyright notice. The FTC should mandate changes in the
language of copyright warnings to correct unsupportable claims-particularly those
192
involving copyright of facts and ideas-and to better inform users of their rights.
The rewording need not be as extensive or as fervent as the copyright notices
proposed by the CCIA.193 For example, appending a simple fair use statement to the
existing notice could prove effective: "This warning does not abridge your rights to
fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107, including for such purposes as education, commentary
and reporting." Such a note would hardly encourage the wide-scale piracy feared by
sports and entertainment companies, nor would it give rise to an affirmative

185 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, para. 2.
186 Id. para. 1.
187 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (empowering the FTC to prevent "unfair methods of competition in

or affecting commerce," as well as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" affecting commerce).
188 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006) (imposing fines or imprisonment on "any person who willfully
infringes a copyright ... for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain," among
other offenses).
189 Ross, supranote 180.
190 MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 2005 U.S. PIRACY FACT SHEET (2005),
http://www.mpaa.org/USPiracyFactSheet.pdf, see also Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases.*
Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-DesistLetters, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 603, 603 (2005) (noting that advancing digital technology enables people to easily copy and
redistribute theatrical quality films, and that problem continues to grow); Anna E. Engelman &
Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 21-27 (2004)
(noting that seventy-seven percent of illegal copies originated within movie industry, such as from
screener DVDs).
191 See, e.g., Matthew
Greensmith, Sept. 11, 2007, http://businessgeek.org/index.php?/
archives/24-Why-would-I-steal-from-myself.html.
192 CCIA Complaint, supra note 5, paras. 63-68.
193 Id. paras. 43-50. For example, the fact a publisher "fully supports educational awareness
programs designed to increase the public's recognition of its fair use rights" is welcome, but
unnecessary. Id. para. 49.
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consumer right to unauthorized use. 194 Moreover, it specifically highlights some of
the more common practices of fair use.
This approach creates at least two additional advantages. First, it does not
disturb the existing copyright scheme, since the new warnings only incorporate the
codified law. Second, it is minimally disruptive to copyright holders, who must
simply adjust their warnings to implement the new standards. Nevertheless, the
affected companies are apt to challenge this proposition, likely concluding in a
judgment by a federal court. 195 For this reason, it may be more efficient to pursue an
alternative judicial or legislative solution from the outset.

C CongressionalAction to Allow Claims of CopyrightAbuse
Enacting new federal legislation offers an alternative and more potent solution
to the problem of copyright warnings. Congress could generally restrict such
warnings or require them to include language affirming users' fair use rights.
However, a more effective solution would be for Congress to amend the Copyright Act
1 96
to create significant penalties for systematic over-claiming of copyright protection.
The new law would impose liability on copyright holders who assert unfounded
protection in public domain, government-produced, or otherwise non-copyrightable
works.1 97 The legislation should also allow individuals to collect damages.1 98 For
example, students purchasing course packs containing materials covered by fair use
would be able to sue to recover their costs. 199 Congress might also tack on an
200
additional penalty for willful fraud.
A statutory scheme is particularly appropriate in this instance, because the
damage suffered by any individual user is insubstantial. 201
For buyers who
mistakenly pay copyright fees for non-copyrightable materials-such as course packs,
194 Ross, supra note 180 (arguing that promoting "consumer rights" could dupe "otherwise wellmeaning individuals" into copyright infringement).
195 Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1660 (speculating that copyright holders would oppose
any attempts to dilute copyright protection, fearing a "slippery slope").
'96 Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud,81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1071-78 (2006) [hereinafter Mazzone,
Copyfra u al.
197 17 U.S.C. § 403 (2006); Mazzone, Copyfraud,supra note 196, at 1072; see also Mazzone, Too
Quick to Copyright, supra note 172, at 34 (arguing for an amendment allowing consumers to sue for
a false copyright just as they can sue for false advertising).
198 Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra note 196, at 1072.
'99 Id. at 1086; Stephana I. Colbert & Oren R. Griffin, The Impact of 'Fair Use" in the Higher
Education Community: A Necessary Exception, 62 ALB. L. REV. 437, 454 (1998).
Colbert and
Griffin suggest that "although the Congress that passed the Copyright Act in 1976 would pretty
clearly have thought it unfair" to copy one-third of a copyrighted work without compensation,
changes in technology and teaching practices over the last two decades "might conceivably make
Congress more sympathetic" to the copier today. Id. Contra Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389-90 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a copy shop infringed by
reproducing five to thirty percent of copyrighted materials for course packs, thereby rejecting a fair
use defense); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding a commercial copier liable for infringement for reproducing copyrighted material in course
packs, and assessing $510,000 in damages to deter future conduct).
200 Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra note 196, at 1073.
201 See Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1659.
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sheet music, or pocket Constitutions-the cost of hiring an attorney would vastly
outweigh any actual damages. 202 Thus, allowing buyers to recover attorney's fees or
additional penalties for willful fraud would provide tremendous disincentive to
copyright warning abuse.
Additionally, Congress must ensure standing for those who do not suffer
monetary injury, but are nonetheless affected by copyright over-claiming. 20 3 For
instance, a filmmaker may refrain from using a copyrighted video clip she really
wants to use, because she accepts an overbroad copyright warning on its face and
20 4
knows permission is too costly to obtain, even though it may constitute a fair use.
To remedy this situation, Congress could give state and federal agencies standing to
pursue these claims on the public's behalf. 20 5 In the absence of such legislation,
consumers will have to rely on courts to address the problem. However, the courts
20 6
have yet to directly address the issue.

D. Courts Should Extend the CopyrightMisuse Doctrine
Just as courts have extended the misuse doctrine from patent law to antitrust
and copyright issues, they should now extend it to deter overaggressive copyright
warnings and protections. 20 7 The foundation for this transferred application is
copyright's "built-in First Amendment accommodations": fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy. 20 8 Copyright misuse is an appropriate response when
209
copyright holders attempt to encroach upon either of these protected user areas.
Public policy favors diminution of the copyright warnings. With the "Progress of
Science" 210 as an instrumental goal, the existing framework is inadequate.
"YouTube" users contributing clips that likely constitute fair use are instead
receiving takedown notices. 211 Merely commenting on the NFL's copyright policy can
212
be enough to draw threats of legal action.
Mazzone, Copyfraud,supra note 196, at 1078.
Id. at 1078-79 (suggesting that standing be extended to private attorneys as one possible
solution, as well as class action litigation).
204 E.g, AUFDERHEIDE & JASZJ, supra note 78, at 10-14; Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at
1655.
205 Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra note 196, at 1084-85.
206 See Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 616 (D.R.I. 1976). In the sole
federal case to weigh "copyright warnings," the court addressed a false and misleading copyright
warning published by the plaintiff in a daily newspaper. Id. The court determined the misleading
warning was insufficient in itself to support an unclean hands complaint, but it added to other
allegations. Id.
207 Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra note 196, at 1087-89; see Ekstrand, supra note 110, at 577-78;
ef Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003)
(hypothesizing attempts
to prevent use of non-copyrightable
data "by contract or
202
203

otherwise . . .might constitute copyright misuse").
208

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).

209 See Judge, supra note 103, at 931.
210 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
211 Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liabilitys

Continuing Tort Framework and Sonys De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 200-01 (2007);
Catherine Rampell, Standing Up To Takedown Notices; Web Users Turn the Tables on Copyright
Holders, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2007, at DOI. A recent study of such takedown notices revealed
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In some respects, the courts serve as the best venue for solving copyright
warning problems. As with fair use, copyright misuse is a judge-made doctrine,
making it relatively flexible and easy to adapt to copyright warnings. 213 Moreover,
the judiciary has traditionally played a central role in shaping copyright law, with
Congress simply codifying common law doctrines. 214 Judges should once again take
the lead in shaping copyright law by expanding the doctrine of misuse beyond its
conventional boundaries.
In the copyright context, courts have been historically reluctant to expand
misuse beyond its traditional role as an equitable defense. 2 15 Since the defense
applies on a case-by-case basis, its impact on copyright warning cases may be less
effectual than a statutory or agency solution. 216 Still, the potential loss to a copyright
holder is significant-being unable to pursue an infringement claim 21 7-and the cost
of changing copyright warnings is very small. Consequently, the sports and
entertainment companies at the heart of the matter are likely to swiftly recalibrate
their warnings to fit the new judicial doctrine.

CONCLUSION

Overbroad copyright warnings pose an indirect but significant challenge to the
public's use and enjoyment of copyrighted materials. By leaving a misleading
impression that practically any unauthorized use is an infringement, such warnings
reduce innovative uses of the material and contribute to an undemocratic "culture of
permission." 218
Their sweeping, threatening language promotes confusion and
uncertainty among both educators and legitimate users alike, and undermines the
constitutional imperative that copyright protection advance "the Progress of

thirty percent presented questionable, or at least arguable, legal claims. Jennifer M. Urban &
Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects?" Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, http://static.chillingeffects.org/Urban-Quilter-512-summary.pdf
(last visited May 22, 2008). See also, generally, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
212 Wendy Seltzer, My First DMCA Takedown, http://wendy.seltzer.org/blog/archives/
2007/02/13/myfirst dmca takedown.html (last visited May 22, 2008).
213 See Patry & Posner, supra note 61, at 1645.
214 Judge, supra note 103, at 912.
215 Mazzone, supra note 196, at 1089. By the time the defense is raised, "the defendant has
already been brought into court and is asking [it] ...to excuse a demonstrated infringement." Id.
216 Id. ("The success of the copyright misuse defense in any single case is uncertain, and even if
courts are very generous in recognizing the defense, the degree to which it will alter general
publishing practices remains unclear.").
217 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990).
218 LESSIG, supra note 67, at 192-93; see also Frank Pasquale, Cyberpersons, Propertization,
and Contractin the Information Culture, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 127 n.57 (citing numerous ways
that permission culture has "crippled innovation" in the music and film industries).
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Intended or not, such undesirable results defeat the very purpose of

220
copyright law-to broadly disseminate new ideas and knowledge.

219 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) ("Because
copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to
creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as
clearly as possible.").
220 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, The Purpose of Copyright,OPEN SPACES QUARTERLY, May 31,
2002, http://www.open-spaces.com/article-v2nl-loren.php (addressing the "dark side" of copyright
law, including "stern FBI warnings at the beginning of video tapes" and lack of public discourse
about balance required in copyright law to promote knowledge and learning).

